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Introduction 
1. Wage employment and wages are central to the world of work. Living standards of wage 
earners depend on the level of wages, and on when they are adjusted and paid. Wages are 
among the foremost subjects of collective bargaining between social partners. They are 
also a major determinant of aggregate demand and a key factor in the economic 
performance of countries. In 2008, through the ILO Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair 
Globalization, the International Labour Conference recognized and declared the 
commitments of Members and the Organization to the objective of promoting “policies in 
regard to wages and earnings, hours and other conditions of work, designed to ensure a just 
share of the fruits of progress to all and a minimum living wage to all employed and in 
need of such protection”. 1 In June 2009, the International Labour Conference, attended by 
tripartite delegations of representatives of governments and employers‟ and workers‟ 
organizations from across the world, adopted the Global Jobs Pact, which involves the 
principle of avoiding the “damaging consequences of deflationary wage spirals and 
worsening working conditions” and named social dialogue, collective bargaining and 
statutory or negotiated minimum wages as the guiding policy options. 2 
2. The Committee on Employment and Social Policy (ESP) has previously debated wage 
developments and related policy issues, 3 and requested the Office to prepare periodic 
reports about wage trends and their policy implications. 4 Building on these debates, this 
paper provides an overview of recent global and regional wage trends and policy 
developments in selected countries, highlighting interrelationships with labour productivity 
and employment trends. This paper draws heavily upon the recently released Global Wage 
Report 2010–11: Wage policies in times of crisis. 5 For the production of that report, the 
Office collaborated with national statistical offices from around the world to compile data 
on monthly average wages. The database used for the Global Wage Report contains wage 
data for 115 countries and territories, which account for approximately 94 per cent of the 
world‟s wage earners and approximately 98.5 per cent of the global wage bill. 6 Section I 
of this paper summarizes recent trends in wages, labour productivity and employment. 
Section II discusses policy instruments and the experience gained with them in some 
member countries, and section III draws conclusions and suggests some points for debate 
and guidance. 
I. Trends in wages and labour productivity  
3. This section presents global and regional wage trends, both in advanced and in emerging 
and developing economies, and highlights two areas that are of particular concern to many 
policy-makers, namely developments in the incidence of low pay and the wage share. 
Trends in wages are examined in the broader context of economic development. While 
 
1 ILO Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization, Part I(A)(ii). 
2 Global Jobs Pact, paras 9.6 and 12.3. 
3 GB.298/ESP/2; GB.303/ESP/1; GB.304/ESP/3. 
4 GB.298/11(Rev.). 
5  ILO: Global Wage Report 2010–11 (Geneva, 2010), available in several languages at 
http://www.ilo.org/global/publications/ilo-bookstore/order-online/books/WCMS_145265/lang--
en/index.htm.   
6  See ILO: Global Wage Report 2010–11 (Geneva, 2010), Statistical appendix, for the list of 
collaborating partners and primary sources and for coverage information. 
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growth of gross domestic product (GDP) provides a first gauge, labour productivity is 
generally preferred as a reference point for wages. 7 This section discusses the factors that 
foster labour productivity, and outlines global trends in labour productivity, employment 
and wages over the past decade.  
Global and regional wage trends  
4. During the decade preceding the global economic crisis, wage trends were characterized by 
a decoupling of wage growth from gains in labour productivity in advanced economies, 8 
the long-run decline in wage shares, and a widening wage inequality often associated with 
an increasing incidence of low pay. 9 
5. The global economic and financial crisis cut global wage growth by half, as shown in 
figure 1. Compared to the pre-crisis growth rates of 2.7 and 2.8 per cent in 2006 and 2007, 
global wage growth almost halved to 1.5 and 1.6 per cent in 2008 and 2009. 10 The fact 
that wages did not fare worse can partly be attributed to the influence of China, where 
wages grew by approximately 12 per cent even at the depth of the crisis. 11 Excluding 
China, global wage growth declined far more sharply, from 2.1 and 2.2 per cent in 2006 
and 2007 to 0.8 and 0.7 per cent in 2008 and 2009. In addition to the substantial job losses 
during the crisis that pushed the global number of unemployed workers to 205 million in 
2010 (27.6 million higher than in 2007), 12 those workers who retained their jobs paid for 
the crisis through weaker wage growth. Both the loss of employment in the formal sector 
and the slower growth of wages and hence incomes are important explanations for the 
persistence of working poverty. The latest ILO estimates show that the number of workers 
living below the extreme poverty threshold of US$1.25 in purchasing power parities (PPP) 
per day was about 40 million higher in 2009 than would have been expected on the basis of 
pre-crisis trends. 13 
  
 
7 In line with these and the new MDG indicator for Target 1.B: “Achieve full and productive 
employment and decent work for all, including women and young people”, the ILO usually defines 
labour productivity as “GDP per person employed”. For a detailed discussion, see also OECD: 
Measuring productivity: OECD Manual – Measurement of aggregate and industry-level 
productivity growth (Paris, 2001), p. 20. 
8 “Advanced economies” refers to 28 countries as listed in ILO: Global Wage Report 2010–11, 
Technical appendix table A1. 
9 ILO: Global Wage Report 2008–09 (Geneva, 2008), in particular Chapters 2 and 3. 
10 All figures refer to real wage growth, i.e. adjusted for inflation. When interpreting trends in 
monthly average wages, it is important to note that average wages can alter as a result of changes in 
either hourly wages or in the number of hours worked, or both. 
11 However, it should be noted that Chinese wage data refer only to “urban units”. 
12 See ILO: Global Employment Trends 2011: The challenge of a jobs recovery (Geneva, 2011), 
p. 12 and table A4; available at http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@dgreports/@dcomm/ 
@publ/documents/publication/wcms_150440.pdf. 
13 ibid., p. 23f. 
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Figure 1. Global wage growth, 2006–09 (year-on-year changes, real terms, percentages) 
 
Note: Global wage growth is calculated as the weighted average of national growth rates of real average monthly wages. For coverage and 
methodology, see ILO: Global Wage Report 2010–11, Technical appendix I. 
Source: ILO Global Wage Database, based on data from national statistical offices. 
Advanced economies 
6. The global estimates reflect large variations in wage growth between regions. One of the 
weakest performances is seen in the advanced economies, where wage growth was 
subdued in the pre-crisis years and turned negative in 2008 (-0.5 per cent; see figure 2, 
panel (a)). Unexpectedly high inflation in 2008 contributed to the decline in the purchasing 
power of wages during that year, whereas unusually low inflation aided the modest 
recovery of real wages in 2009 (+0.6 per cent). To the extent that low-paid workers were 
the first to lose their jobs during the recession, this changed the composition of the 
population of wage earners towards better paid employees. This composition effect 
introduces a well-known countercyclical bias that stabilizes average wages during a 
recession, despite large reductions in monthly pay for individual workers for example, due 
to the drastic reduction in hours worked that was seen in some countries. 14 
  
 
14 For sources and a detailed discussion see ILO: Global Wage Report 2010–11, Chapter 1. 
2.7
2.8
1.5
1.6
2.1
2.2
0.8
0.7
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
2006 2007 2008 2009
Global wage growth Global wage growth (excluding China)
W
ag
e 
g
ro
w
th
(%
)
GB.310/ESP/3 
 
4 GB310-ESP_3_[2011-02-0030-1]-En.docx  
0.5
0.9 0.8
-0.5
0.6
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2000-05 2006 2007 2008 2009
W
ag
e 
g
ro
w
th
(%
)
100
102
104
106
108
110
112
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Labour productivity Real average wages
C
u
u
la
tiv
e
g
ro
w
th
(1
99
9 
= 
10
0)
Figure 2. Wage growth and labour productivity growth in advanced countries, 2000–09 
(a)  Year-on-year wage growth (b)  Cumulative wage and labour productivity 
growth (1999 = 100) 
Note: Regional wage growth is calculated as the weighted average of national growth rates of real average monthly wages. For coverage and 
methodology, see ILO: Global Wage Report 2010–11, Technical appendix I. To improve comparability, the labour productivity trend is calculated as 
a weighted average of national growth rates. 
Source: ILO Global Wage Database, based on data from national statistical offices. 
7. Taking a longer term view, average wages in advanced countries grew by only 5.2 per cent 
over the entire decade (level in 2009, as compared to 1999). Despite the adverse impact of 
the crisis in the final years of the decade, labour productivity grew by 10.3 per cent over 
the same period and thus almost twice as fast as wages. The divergence between wages 
and productivity finds its main cause in low wage growth during the pre-crisis period. 
Despite robust economic growth and annual gains in labour productivity between 1.0 and 
2.1 per cent during the years from 2002 to 2007 (see section “Labour productivity” below), 
annual wage growth in advanced countries was less than 1 per cent during the boom period 
(see figure 2, panel (a)). This long-run deviation has led to a decoupling of wage growth 
from productivity growth in advanced countries (see figure 2, panel (b)). Since the figures 
refer to a weighted average, developments in the three largest advanced economies (United 
States, Japan and Germany) have a particular impact on this outcome. 15 The erosion of 
workers‟ bargaining power and the rise of non-standard forms of employment with low 
monthly wages both contributed to the decoupling of wages from productivity. 16  
 
15 For Germany, see the detailed analysis based on data from the Federal Statistical Office, in ILO: 
Global Wage Report 2010–11, Datenblatt Deutschland (available in German only at 
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@dgreports/@dcomm/@publ/documents/publication/wc
ms_150027.pdf). For the United States and other advanced countries, the US Bureau of Labor 
Statistics provides useful estimates on productivity in its publication International comparisons of 
GDP per capita and per employed person (2009) (available from http://www.bls.gov/fls/flsgdp.pdf, 
see table 4) that reflect the same general trends estimated by the Office on the basis of World Bank 
data. 
16 For a discussion of the role of the latter in the case of Germany, see Datenblatt Deutschland 
(op. cit.). 
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Emerging and developing economies 
8. Overall, wage growth has been substantially higher in emerging and developing 
economies. 17 For the economies of Central Europe, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, the 
high wage growth up to the crisis also reflects the depth of wage decline during the 
transition period in the 1990s, and thus the low basis at the beginning of the 2000s (see 
figure 3, panels (a) and (b)). While the first half of the past decade was disappointing for 
wage earners in Latin America and the Caribbean (with annual growth rates of only 0.4 per 
cent from 2000 to 2005), the region recorded solid real wage growth of 4.2 and 3.3 per 
cent in 2006 and 2007 (see figure 3, panel (c)). Partly due to the strong performance of 
China, wage growth in Asia 18 exceeded 7 per cent per year throughout the decade (see 
figure 3, panel (d)). Again, this trend needs to be seen in the context of still low wage 
levels and is an outcome predicted by classical development theory when rapid 
industrialization leads to labour shortages. 19 For both Africa and the Middle East, data 
constraints do not allow for reliable estimates. However, provisional and tentative 
estimates indicate that wages in Africa grew during the past decade, while they effectively 
stagnated in the Middle East (see figure 3, panels (e) and (f)). 
9. The largest impact of the global economic and financial crisis on wages can be seen in 
Central and Eastern Europe (where wages fell by -0.1 per cent in 2009) and in Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia (with a fall of -2.2 per cent in 2009). 20 This adverse impact on 
wages comes in addition to a substantial rise in unemployment during the crisis, and helps 
to explain the rise in working poverty (using the threshold of US$2.00 PPP per day). 21 
Wage growth slowed down considerably in Latin America and the Caribbean, but held 
firm in Asia, whose economies weathered the crisis best. Due to data constraints, no clear 
findings emerge for Africa and the Middle East. In many countries, the spike in food prices 
in 2008 also eroded the real purchasing power of wages during that year. 
  
 
17 For the purposes of this paper, all countries not grouped under “Advanced countries” are referred 
to as emerging and developing economies. 
18 Excluding Japan, the Republic of Korea and Singapore, which are grouped as advanced countries 
(see ILO: Global Wage Report 2010–11, Technical appendix I). 
19 See W.A. Lewis: “Economic development with unlimited supplies of labour”, in The Manchester 
School, Vol. 22 (1954), pp. 139–191, and S. Kuznets: “Economic growth and income inequality”, in 
American Economic Review, Vol. 45, No. 1 (1955), pp. 1–28. However, it should be noted that in 
many of these Asian countries, including China, wage growth tended to lag behind labour 
productivity growth. 
20 The regions correspond to the countries covered by the DWT/CO–Budapest (Central and Eastern 
Europe) and the DWT/CO–Moscow (Eastern Europe and Central Asia). 
21 See ILO: Global Employment Trends 2011, op. cit. 
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Figure 3. Wage growth in emerging and developing economies, 2000–09 
(a)  Central and Eastern Europe (b)  Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
(c)  Latin America and the Caribbean (d)  Asia 
(e)  Africa (f)  Middle East 
Notes: * Provisional estimates (based on coverage of ca. 75 per cent). ** Tentative estimates (based on coverage of ca. 40 per cent to ca. 60 per 
cent). (...) = No estimate available. For technical notes, see figure 4 below.  
Source: ILO Global Wage Database, based on data from national statistical offices. 
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Low-pay incidence 
10. As stated earlier, wage inequality widened during the decade prior to the outbreak of the 
global economic crisis. This was predominantly the result of a “flying top” (rapidly 
increasing wages at the top), but also of a “collapsing bottom” (a decoupling of the lowest 
wages from the overall trend) and wage polarization (a combination of both trends). 22 
Low-paid workers, defined as those whose hourly wages are less than two-thirds of the 
median wage across all jobs, 23 acquire special relevance in current times since they are 
particularly vulnerable to economic crises. Low-wage work, often in conjunction with 
wage instability and time-related underemployment, increases workers‟ likelihood of 
falling into or remaining trapped in poverty. Trends in low-pay work during an economic 
downturn are thus a good test of the effectiveness of anti-crisis policy responses.  
11. The share of low-paid workers increased in a majority of countries with available data 
between the late 1990s and 2007–09, while wide variations in the incidence of low pay 
remain between countries, including between advanced economies. 24 Despite generally 
lower labour market participation, women account for a majority of low-paid workers in 
virtually all countries with available data. Women‟s over-representation among low-paid 
workers has a negative effect on the gender pay gap. The findings also show that youth, 
those with low levels of education and members of disadvantaged ethnic minorities or 
immigrant groups are particularly vulnerable to being trapped in low-wage jobs. The types 
of employment and contract have been also found to increase the risk of low pay: non-
regular and short-term jobs are associated with higher incidence of low pay than regular 
jobs.  
Trends in the wage share  
12. If average wages do not grow in line with labour productivity, it follows that the share of 
wages in GDP falls (assuming that the share of employees in total employment stays 
roughly constant). The functional distribution of national income between labour and 
capital has hence been of long-standing interest to labour economists, and the Office has 
collaborated with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
to analyse the trends in wage shares for the “real economy” (i.e. excluding the financial 
sector) of 31 OECD member countries. 25 Since profits fall more sharply during a recession 
than wages, the wage share displays clear counter-cyclical movements (and increased 
during the crisis in most countries included in the analysis). However, over the course of 
several business cycles, there is a predominant long-run downward trend in OECD 
countries. 26 For instance, out of the 24 countries where the time series goes back to 1980, 
no fewer than 17 saw a decline in the wage share up to 2007. In a majority of countries, 
this pattern can also be observed at the sectoral level (and is only to a lesser degree the 
result of employment shifts between sectors). The manufacturing sector generally suffered 
 
22 See ILO: Global Wage Report 2008–09, section 3.2. 
23 This definition has been adopted for the ILO‟s decent work indicator for “low pay rate”; see 
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups7public/dgreports/integration/documents/meetingdocument/wcm
s_115402.pdf. 
24 See ILO: Global Wage Report 2010–11, Chapter 3, in particular figure 20. The financial support 
of the Republic of Korea towards a research project on low pay is acknowledged with gratitude. 
25 For details see ILO: Global Wage Report 2010–11, Chapter 2.1 and Technical appendix II. All 
data refer to unadjusted wage shares. Note that the report still refers to OECD countries and Estonia, 
which joined the OECD after the report went to press. 
26 For a similar result, see also IMF: World Economic Outlook, April 2007 (Washington, DC), 
Chapter 5.   
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the largest long-term decline in the share of wages in value added. Globalization and 
technological change, due both to factor productivity changes favouring capital and to 
changes in skill structure penalizing low-skilled workers, as well as the weakening of trade 
unions and collective bargaining, account for this trend. 27 
Labour productivity 
Drivers of labour productivity 
13. Investments into productive capacity and technological innovation are long-term 
determinants of productivity, and generate the conditions for a shift towards higher value 
added activities such as manufacturing. 28 Macroeconomic and industrial policy, and sound 
management of the financial system, play an equally important role in laying the 
foundations for productivity growth. At the micro level, workers‟ skills, and skills 
development and training, and how efficiently the different factors of production are 
combined, are crucial determinants of labour productivity. 29 In this regard, the economic 
literature has highlighted the importance of the productivity of both the employee and the 
entrepreneur (pointing out the repercussions of management failure), and of management–
worker cooperation and social dialogue at the industry and enterprise level as an effective 
way to improve production processes and raise efficiency. 30 
Trends in labour productivity and employment 
14. Increasing labour productivity is one of the main long-term determinants of economic 
growth. When analysing economic trends, it can be useful to decompose growth into the 
contribution made by changes in labour productivity and those that are due to an expansion 
of employment (as shown in figure 4). 31 In the immediate pre-crisis period from 2004 to 
2007, the world as a whole achieved both increases in labour productivity (which grew at 
annual rates of about 3 per cent during this period) and an expansion of employment (at 
about 2 per cent per year). As a result, output grew at rates close to 5 per cent from 2004 to 
2007 (see figure 4, panel (a)). The strongest performance was seen in the emerging and 
developing economies, 32 where labour productivity grew at rates between 5 and 6 per cent 
in the immediate pre-crisis period and employment expanded at rates close to 2 per cent. In 
this group of countries, GDP growth exceeded 7 per cent and reached 8.1 per cent in 2007 
(see figure 4, panel (c)). Growth in the advanced countries was still strong and averaged 
 
27 ILO: Global Wage Report 2008–09, p. 22. 
28 For the example of Asia, see A. Amsden: The rise of “the rest”: Challenges to the West from 
late-industrializing economies (Oxford, 2001). 
29  The 97th Session of the International Labour Conference (2008) examined in detail the 
contribution that skills development and training can make to productivity growth. See: Conclusions 
on skills for improved productivity, employment growth and development, International Labour 
Conference, 97th Session, Geneva, 2008; available at http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---
ed_emp/---ifp_skills/documents/publication/wcms_103457.pdf. 
30 R. Freeman and J.L. Medoff: What do unions do? (New York, Basic Books, 1984); R. Buchele 
and J. Christiansen: “Productivity, real wages and worker rights: A cross-national comparison”, in 
Labour, Vol. 9, No. 3 (Sept. 1995), pp. 405–422. 
31 See also the chapter on labour productivity in T. Sparreboom and A. Albee (eds): Towards decent 
work: Monitoring MDG1B employment indicators in sub-Saharan Africa (Geneva, ILO, 
forthcoming 2011). 
32 A more detailed breakdown by region is available in ILO: Global Wage Report 2010–11, fig. 13. 
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nearly 3 per cent, accompanied by employment creation and productivity growth (see 
figure 4, panel (b)).  
15. The global economic crisis brought this positive trend to an abrupt halt. In the world as a 
whole, GDP growth turned negative in 2009. The decline in labour productivity was even 
sharper than the decline of GDP since employment continued to grow modestly in 2009, 
though the pace was uneven across regions and fell short of the growth of the labour 
force. 33 The advanced economies experienced the sharpest drop in output (by more than 
3 per cent), while employment in advanced economies declined by just over 2 per cent and 
labour productivity fell. By contrast, in emerging and developing economies both GDP 
growth and employment growth stayed positive (at about 1.5 per cent), resulting in a 
stagnation of labour productivity. Labour productivity usually rebounds quickly during the 
recovery from recessions. Preliminary estimates indicate that this was also the case in 
2010, when labour productivity grew by approximately 3.1 per cent in advanced countries 
and by approximately 4.8 per cent in emerging and developing countries. 
Figure 4. Growth in GDP, employment and labour productivity, 2000–10* (percentages) 
(a)  World (b)  Advanced economies 
 
 
 
(c)  Emerging economies 
 
Notes: * Data for 2010 are provisional estimates. “Advanced economies” refers to 28 advanced countries as listed in ILO: Global Wage Report  
2010–11, Technical appendix table A1. “Emerging and developing economies” refers to all other economies. Growth rates refer to the year-on-year 
growth of the world or regional aggregates (GDP and employment) and the world or regional averages (labour productivity). 
Source: ILO calculations based on GDP data from the World Bank (GDP in constant 2005 PPP US$) and employment data from the ILO’s Global 
Employment Trends model. 
 
33 The sharp decline in worldwide labour productivity is partly the result of a composition effect, 
since employment fell in advanced economies (with high productivity), but continued to grow in 
emerging and developing economies (with lower productivity). Employment in emerging and 
developing economies thus accounted for a larger proportion of the global total in 2009 than in 
2008, depressing average productivity. 
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Labour productivity and wages 
16. While productivity growth is universally recognized as one of the drivers of development, 
it is not an end in itself but a means to improve workers‟ lives by providing the foundations 
for sustainable wage increases. 
34
 If wage growth consistently exceeds productivity gains, 
this can undermine the sustainability of enterprises and harm their competitiveness. If 
wage growth lags behind productivity growth, workers do not fully participate in the fruits 
of progress and productivity gains do not fully translate into better living standards for 
workers. Whereas profits tend to be volatile along the business cycle, a long-term 
alignment of wages and labour productivity also stabilizes the share of operating surplus in 
total value added (which, in turn, can be re-invested by enterprises). Wages are also an 
important source of domestic demand, which in turn is an important determinant of 
growth. For these reasons, labour productivity is widely accepted as a reference point for 
wages, in particular in advanced countries where the large majority of workers are wage 
earners. While short-run deviations between productivity and wages can often be explained 
by cyclical effects, a long-run divergence has more profound implications.  
17. For a cross-section of 108 countries and territories with available data from the ILO‟s 
Global Wage Database, figure 5 shows a positive association between productivity and 
wages across countries. When comparing between countries, wages are estimated to be 
higher by about US$0.44 for every US$1.00 difference in labour productivity (expressed in 
PPP). While differences in labour productivity explain about two-thirds of differences in 
wages, there is a considerable variation and some countries have considerably lower wages 
than one would expect given their productivity level. Moreover, the observed cross-section 
relationship is in part due to an identity in the OECD System of National Accounts since 
the compensation of employees (and hence wages) is itself an major component of GDP. 35 
Further, the finding of an association in a cross-section of countries does not imply that 
wages grow in line with productivity over time in any given country (see above for a 
discussion of the decoupling of wages and labour productivity in advanced countries).  
  
 
34  See also Conclusions concerning skills for improved productivity, employment growth and 
development, International Labour Conference, 97th Session, Geneva, 2008, in particular para. 7ff. 
35  See EC–IMF–OECD–UN–World Bank: System of National Accounts (1993), Primary 
Distribution of Income Account (Chapter VII), available at http://unstats.un.org/unsd/sna1993/ 
toctop.asp. 
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Figure 5. Labour productivity levels and wage levels, 2009 or latest available year (cross-section) 
Note: “Labour productivity” refers to GDP in 2005 PPP US$ per person employed; data are for 2009 or the latest available observation from any 
given country that is included in the ILO’s Global Wage Database. Yearly wages are estimated as 12 x average monthly wages (the main indicator 
collected in the database). For most countries, wage data refer to the formal sector only. 
Source: ILO Global Wage Database 2010–11, ILO calculations based on GDP data from the World Bank (GDP in constant 2005 PPP US$) and 
employment data from the ILO’s Global Employment Trends model. 
II. Wage policies  
18. The trends discussed above have important implications for policy-making towards a 
broad-based recovery. Why should policy-makers care about wage policies during the 
crisis and the recovery process? One reason concerns social justice and the hardship that 
inequality and low wages impose on households, particularly at the lower end of the wage 
distribution. Another reason, however, which has recently re-emerged in policy debates, is 
the macroeconomic effects of wages. While wages that are low relative to productivity 
may help boost a country‟s exports, it is important to keep in mind that not all countries 
can improve their competitiveness simultaneously and that low wages depress household 
consumption and hence aggregate demand. 36  Investment in productive capacity itself 
depends at least partly on the extent to which households are able to consume what 
enterprises produce. This suggests that the quality and pace of the recovery and the 
resumption of economic growth will, in part, depend on the recovery of wages and 
household income.  
19. There is now a broad-based debate on how far the wage trends prior to the global 
economic crisis mentioned in paragraph 4 above have contributed to global imbalances by 
depressing domestic demand, causing increasing reliance on exports and contributing to 
 
36 See also ILO: Setting policy directions for job creation and poverty reduction, technical paper 
submitted to the Asian Employment Forum (Beijing, 2007). 
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the build-up of unsustainable household debt. 37 Wage policies can play an important role 
in addressing imbalances and in fostering sustainable economic growth in the post-crisis 
period. A recent IMF paper argues that a “restoration of workers‟ earnings – for example, 
by strengthening collective bargaining rights – [allows workers] to work their way out of 
debt over time”, therefore reducing leverage and the risk of future financial crises. 38 This 
section will discuss some of the instruments available to constituents, namely collective 
bargaining, minimum wages and income policies aimed at low-income policies, and report 
on the experience gained in some ILO member countries. 
Collective bargaining: Strengthening the linkage 
between wages and productivity 
20. Collective bargaining remains the single most important institution through which social 
partners can directly bargain over the share of value added which goes into wages. Market 
forces alone do not deliver the best outcomes with respect to decent work. Indeed, a stable 
wage share is often the result of institutional settings and practices that are able to strike a 
balance between wages that are high enough to sustain consumption consistent with 
overall economic growth and adequate returns to investment. Engaging in collective 
bargaining and worker information, consultation and participation are also distinctive 
features of any sustainable enterprise. 39  Despite its beneficial role in wage-fixing, 
collective bargaining coverage has, nonetheless, been declining in some settings, and this 
is a matter of concern. A number of recent country examples may provide valuable insights 
on how to reverse this trend, in view also of economic recovery. These country 
experiences show how collective bargaining can help adapt to economic uncertainties and 
downturns through short-term adjustments and concessions on wages and other working 
conditions, while permitting a more expeditious alignment of wages with productivity 
gains when the economy recovers.  
21. Uruguay, for example, reintroduced the wage council system in March 2005 to determine 
wages by sector of activity. During the period from 2005 to 2009, the wage councils 
operated as a strongly coordinated sectoral bargaining system. At the time of the 
reintroduction of the wage council system, Uruguay was coming out of the deepest 
recession in its recent history. The new system ensured that the strong economic recovery 
translated not only into an increase in the employment rate from 51.5 per cent in 2004 to 
58.6 per cent in 2009 and a drop in unemployment from a peak of 18 per cent in 2003 to 
7.6 per cent in 2009, but also into strong real wage growth of around 5 per cent per year. 40 
These results were reached while maintaining both fiscal and price stability. This 
experience challenges the view that policy-makers should first aim to increase growth, 
followed by employment creation and only then aim at improving wages. In fact, the 
simultaneous recovery of wages and employment in Uruguay appears to have played a key 
role in sustaining significant economic growth.  
22. Recent examples show that the role of trade unions in linking wages to labour productivity 
also remains strong in periods of crisis. It is interesting to see, for example, that Germany‟s 
response to the crisis has reinforced its core institutions and the willingness of major 
 
37  See also IMF–ILO: The challenges of growth, employment and social cohesion, Discussion 
document for the Joint ILO–IMF conference in cooperation with the office of the Prime Minister of 
Norway (Oslo, 2010). 
38 Cited from the IMF journal Finance & Development (Dec. 2010). 
39  See Conclusions concerning the promotion of sustainable enterprises, International Labour 
Conference, 96th Session, Geneva, 2007, in particular para. 13. 
40 See ILO: Global Wage Report 2010–11, box 8. 
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stakeholders to work together. With the help of state subsidies, employers kept their long-
term commitments to core workers and, in return, trade unions and work councils agreed to 
make concessions in terms of pay and working conditions. Industry-wide collective 
bargaining also brought about considerable real wage cuts, and made the timing of wage 
increases contingent on economic recovery. 41 The model of close cooperation explains, at 
least in part, the low number of job losses during the crisis, in spite of a sharp economic 
contraction. The German experience contrasts with countries with weak collective 
bargaining institutions, including countries in Central and Eastern Europe. There, 
enterprises responded to the crisis by sharply reducing employment, and adjustments in 
hours that helped to stabilize employment elsewhere played only a marginal role. 42 
Minimum wages: Protecting low-paid workers 
23. In light of the limited coverage of collective bargaining in some countries and the 
challenges confronting trade unions to organize low-paid workers, minimum wages can 
play an important complementary role. They can protect the purchasing power of low-paid 
workers, strengthen aggregate demand, promote stability and avoid sections of society 
feeling left behind during periods of economic recovery and growth. 43 Even during the 
crisis year of 2009, a majority of countries with available data adjusted the (nominal) 
minimum wage upwards. 44 This shows continuity with a more “active” use of minimum 
wage policies by countries across the world in the decade prior to the current global 
economic crisis. It also presents a departure from the experience during previous crises, 
and is in line with the recommendation of the Global Jobs Pact that governments should 
consider minimum wages as an option to avoid deflationary wage spirals. 45 
24. Room for increasing minimum wages depends not only on the overall economic context, 
but also on their initial level. The Minimum Wage Fixing Convention, 1970 (No. 131), 
which considers that minimum wage systems are necessary to protect wage earners against 
unduly low wages, calls for setting levels that take into consideration: (a) the needs of 
workers and their families, taking into account the general level of wages in the country, 
the cost of living, social security benefits, and the relative living standards of other social 
groups; as well as (b) economic factors, including the requirements of economic 
development, levels of productivity and the desirability of attaining and maintaining a high 
level of employment.  
25. The United Kingdom seems to be one country that succeeded in striking such a balance. In 
2010, a survey of British political experts identified the minimum wage as the most 
successful government policy of the past 30 years. 46 The criteria used to define the success 
of a policy were successful implementation, positive social and economic impacts, and 
sustainability over time. In the United Kingdom, the minimum wage was introduced in 
1999, after the reforms of the 1980s had eroded collective bargaining in many industries 
 
41 The industry-level agreements often included clauses which allowed the actual implementation of 
the wage agreements at the industry level to be negotiated at an enterprise level, providing 
additional flexibility to firms and workers in distress (“opening clauses”). 
42 See ILO: Global Wage Report 2010–11, Chapter 5.1. 
43 See also Global Jobs Pact, para. 23. 
44 See ILO: Global Wage Report 2010–11, table 5. 
45 Global Jobs Pact, para. 12(3). 
46 Institute for Government: “What makes a „successful policy‟?”, Analysis of Political Studies 
Association survey data (London, November 2010), available at 
http://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/pdfs/PSA_survey_results.pdf. 
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and abolished wage councils. Contrary to widespread fears at the time, the minimum wage 
had no apparent negative impact either on employment or wage inflation over its first ten 
years. 47 
26. A carefully designed minimum wage can also have a positive impact in developing 
countries and has increasingly been revitalized by policy-makers. In Latin America, 18 out 
of 22 countries adjusted their minimum wages in 2009 slightly above or close to past 
inflation figures. However, as the actual inflation rate was lower than expected, these 
adjustments resulted in real minimum wage increases that helped avoid deflationary 
pressures without jeopardizing employment. In Brazil, a country with a large informal 
economy, the national minimum wage is among the policies that are most frequently 
credited for the sharp reduction in inequality and the decline of working poverty over the 
past decade, without seemingly slowing employment growth. 48 The minimum wage in 
Brazil has been raised consistently from 33 per cent of median wages in 2002 to more than 
42 per cent of median wages, according to the most recent data. 49 Even during the crisis, 
the minimum wage was raised in real terms by 6 per cent two months earlier than 
originally scheduled. This, along with assuring liquidity to the financial sector, continued 
implementation of an ambitious infrastructure investment programme and reinforced social 
protection, was central to the government‟s anti-crisis response. This “active” minimum 
wage policy has been also a core element in Brazil‟s strategy to build up a middle class and 
support the emergence of a domestic market supported by domestic household 
consumption.  
Coherence between collective bargaining 
and minimum-wage setting 
27. While the importance of both minimum wages and collective bargaining has long been 
recognized, their effectiveness and macroeconomic contribution has attracted increasing 
attention from policy-makers. First, more efforts have been made to implement wage 
policies better and to make them more effective. In this respect, securing policy coherence 
is often considered critical. For instance, creating a complementary relationship between 
minimum wages and collective bargaining is a daunting task in many developing countries. 
Minimum wages are mainly intended to protect unorganized, unskilled low-paid workers. 
When their level is set too high, this increases the risk that they fail to protect low-paid 
workers effectively and, at the same time, minimum wage-setting runs the danger of 
effectively replacing collective bargaining. For this reason, developing countries such as 
the Philippines are in the process of improving the current tripartite wage commissions to 
secure better policy coherence between minimum wages and collective bargaining by 
introducing a two-tier system with statutory minimum wages for lowest paid workers and 
non-binding wage guidelines for collective bargaining.  
28. Second, in light of the experiences of the global economic crisis, these wage policies are 
being considered in terms of their potentially positive contributions to economic growth 
and macroeconomic stability. An increasing number of economists and policy-makers 
argue that, in order to address the imbalances that contributed to the global financial and 
economic crisis, a new strategy is needed to maintain stable consumption demand through 
 
47 Low Pay Commission Report (2009), National Minimum Wage (Norwich, The Stationery Office, 
2009), p. ix. 
48 The Economist (“Lula‟s legacy”, 30 Sep. 2010) points out for example that “median earnings are 
rising and, despite a minimum wage at its highest in real terms since 1979, so is employment”.   
49 See ILO: Global Wage Report 2010–11, figure 31. 
GB.310/ESP/3 
 
GB310-ESP_3_[2011-02-0030-1]-En.docx  15 
solid income growth. 50  Effective wage policies, if well-designed and properly 
implemented, can strengthen the long-run linkage between wages and productivity, thereby 
sustaining consumption demand. This view, for instance, appears to be reflected in China‟s 
12th Five Year Plan which emphasizes the need for increasing workers‟ disposable income 
and domestic consumption in line with labour productivity.  
Broadening wage policies to ensure minimum income 
for vulnerable workers and their families 
29. Even with effective collective bargaining and minimum wages, some workers with low 
levels of education and productivity may be at risk of poverty. In such cases, “in-work 
benefits” – which take the form of tax credits, wage-related transfers or other lump-sum 
payments 51 to low-paid workers – can be a complementary instrument to increase the 
disposable incomes of such workers. As these schemes tend to include an element of work 
incentive, the amount of the benefits is typically a function of gross earnings with phase-in 
and phase-out elements. In other words, total benefits tend to increase as earnings increase 
and, beyond a certain threshold, remain flat, and then begin to fall. This design encourages 
low-paid workers to stay in the labour market.  
30. Examples include the earned income tax credit in the United States, the working tax credit 
in the United Kingdom, or the “prime pour l‟emploi” (PPE) in France. In France, the group 
of experts that has reviewed the national minimum wage since 2009 considers that the 
most important determinant of poverty is the insufficient number of hours worked, before 
the low level of hourly wages. It therefore considers that minimum wage alone cannot 
solve the problem of poverty and that it must be complemented by so-called in-work 
benefits and other measures of social protection. 52 The experience of the United Kingdom 
prior to 1999 shows however that in the absence of a minimum wage, in-work benefits 
may turn into some kind of wage subsidy when companies feel that they can shift some 
labour costs to tax credits. 53 Both measures are therefore complementary.  
31. Finally, the introduction of in-work benefit schemes may be challenging for developing 
countries, especially during the crisis, given the massive size of the informal economy and 
the existing budgetary constraints. Yet, despite the obvious constraints, recent experiences 
in developing countries show that their implementation may be possible. 54  In the 
Philippines, for instance, non-wage benefits packages were introduced during the 
economic crisis to improve income for low-paid workers. One of these packages is the 
exemption from income tax payment, which was estimated to add about 37 to 61 pesos per 
day (slightly more than 10 per cent of the minimum wage) to the disposable income of 
 
50 See J-P. Fitoussi and J. Stiglitz: The ways out of the crisis and the building of a more cohesive 
world, The Shadow GN, Chair‟s summary (Rome, LUISS Guido Carli, 2009). See also M. Kumhof 
and R. Ranciere: Inequality, leverage and crises, IMF Working Paper No. 10/268 (Washington, DC, 
2010). 
51 For a review of policies in industrialized countries, see H. Immervoll and M. Pearson: A good 
time for making work pay? Taking stock of in-work benefits and related measures across the 
OECD, IZA Policy Paper No. 3 (Bonn, Institute for the Study of Labour, 2009). 
52 P. Champsaur: Salaire minimum interprofessionnel de croissance : Rapport du groupe d’experts 
(Paris, Ministère du travail, des relations sociales, de la famille de la solidarité et de la ville, 2009), 
p. 6, available at http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/rapports-publics/094000572/index.shtml. 
53 D. Metcalf: “Nothing new under the sun: The prescience of W.S. Sanders‟ 1906 Fabian Tract”, in 
British Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 47, No. 2 (2009), pp. 289–305. 
54  For a review, see T. Peralta and E. Guirao: Low-paid workers in the Philippines, National 
technical report prepared for the ILO Global Wage Report 2010–11. 
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minimum-wage earners. 55 At the same time, when in-work benefits remain a difficult 
policy option, broader income-transfer schemes, which are not related to employment and 
earning status, can be used. Examples include the Bolsa Familia in Brazil or Child support 
grants in South Africa.  
III. Conclusions and points for debate 
32. This paper has presented data on recent trends in wages that show a sharp slow down of 
global wage growth during the global economic and financial crisis. This short-run 
development can be placed in a context of subdued global wage growth in the long run, 
especially in the advanced countries where wages have become increasingly decoupled 
from gains in labour productivity. It has also discussed the role wage policies can play in 
addressing these imbalances towards a sustainable and broad-based recovery from the 
crisis. In the light of the above, the ESP may wish to shed further light on the experience 
gained with policy instruments, in particular:  
(a) how collective bargaining can help to strengthen links between labour productivity 
and wages and create an environment that supports a virtuous circle of productivity 
gains and wage growth and thus employment and economic growth and development;  
(b) the role of minimum wages in setting a wage floor, protecting low-paid workers, and 
ensuring that economic recovery translates into rising living standards for all;  
(c) the experience with a broader income policy, including in-work benefits and cash 
transfers, in addressing working poverty and contributing to domestic demand;  
(d) issues regarding the coherence between the above policy tools, and ways to ensure 
their complementarity; and 
(e) how skills development and small enterprise development can contribute to enhanced 
labour productivity in small and medium-sized enterprises, thereby allowing a 
stronger and better distributed wage growth. 
33. The Committee may also wish to provide further guidance to the Office for its future work 
on wage policies. 
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